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Effective Guaranty of a Speedy Trial for Conmicts
in Other Jurisdictions
Many persons serving sentences in one jurisdiction may face crim-
inal liability for acts which they are alleged to have committed in
another jurisdiction.' Current law often permits the second jurisdiction
to delay the trial of such convicts2 until they are released. The delay,
which may amount to many years,3 creates the same disadvantages for
the convict which the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial4 was
designed to avoid, and then some. It prejudices his defense in the
eventual trial; it leaves him subject to the anxiety of a threatened
prosecution, and thus hinders any effects at rehabilitation; it may, if
the incarcerating jurisdiction is notified of the pending charge, lead to
confinement under maximum security, denial of trusty status, and loss
of eligibility for parole; finally, it costs the convict his chance to serve
the two sentences concurrently.
The right to a speedy trial has until now been of little help to con-
victs facing a pending charge in another jurisdiction. But the recent
decision of the Supreme Court in Klopfer v. North Carolinau gives new
1. There are no available figures for the proportion of convicts who have charges
pending against them in other jurisdictions. The best estimates are derived from the
number of convicts who have detainers filed against them. (For a discussion of detainers
and their consequences, see p. 771 infra.) A high proportion of detainers are backed
by criminal charges. Heyns, The Detainer in a State Correctional S stcm, FEDMaL POMD-
ToIN, July-September, 1945, at 13, 15. As of 1964, 3,00 federal convicts (5 per cnt of all
federal convicts) had one or more detainers filed against them. Letter from Ira Kirschbaum,
Office of the Legal Counsel, United States Bureau of Prisons, January 20, 1957, on file in
Yale Law Journal office. The proportion in the federal penitentaries, where the more
serious offenders are imprisoned, runs as high as 50 per cent. Bennett, The Last Full
Ounce, FEDERAL PROBATION, June, 1959, at 21 [hereinafter cited as Bennett]. High propor-
tions also exist for at least some of the states. CouNCIL ON STATE GOvEMNMENTS, MEET=NG
ON THE AGREEMENT ON DErAiNERs, August 28, 1966, at 2 [hereinafter cited as MaoING ON
AGREEMENT].
2. "Convict" is used in this Note to indicate a person who has been convicted and is
serving a sentence rather than one who is jailed awaiting formal charge or trial.
3. E.g., Wzesinki v. Amos, 143 F. Supp. 585 (N.D. Ind. 1956) (defendant, who bad been
a convict in Indiana, held not to have been denied a speedy trial when he 'was brought to
trial in 1956 on a 1948 federal indictment).
4. Besides the sixth amendment in the United States Constitution, the right to a speedy
trial is guaranteed in varying degrees by 43 state constitutions and by statutes or court
decisions in the remaining states. Numerous statutes implement the right in detail in all
these states. Note, Convicts-The Right to a Speedy Trial and the New Detainer Statutes,
18 RurEms L. REv. 828 n.2 (1964). Rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
is often said to implement this sixth amendment right. See, e.g., United States v. Palermo,
27 F.R.D. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). However, Rule 48(b) is not coextensive with the sixth
amendment. See, e.g., Mann v. United States, 304 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 896 (1962) (court allowed re-indictment of the defendant on a charge which had been
dismissed under Rule 48(b), saying it would not have allowed re-indictment if there bad
been a violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial).
5. 386 US. 213 (1967). See p. 769 infra.
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promise of solutions to the problem of the pending charge. Beyond the
problem of the pending charge is the problem of the delayed charge-
the case in which the second jurisdiction delays even bringing a charge
against the convict until his sentence has run." The new emphasis on
the right to speedy trial also suggests limitations upon this kind of
delay.
I. The Convict and the Right to a Speedy Trial
Though securely rooted in history,7 the right to a speedy trial has
until recently been assigned second-class status. Courts have empha-
sized the relativity, rather than the importance, of the right., In the
words of an oft-quoted dictum: "The right of a speedy trial is necessarily
relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances.
... It does not preclude the rights of public justice."" Courts have gen-
erally been as solicitous in accepting prosecutors' excuses for delay, as
they have been strict in requiring defendants to prove that delays caused
actual prejudice to their defense.10 Waiver doctrines have forced de-
fendants to demand a speedy trial or find that they have lost the right to
one, imposing upon them the unpleasant dilemma of either accepting
harmful delay or endangering their hopes that the prosecutor might
drop the charges against them.11
6. See pp. 780-83 infra.
7. The historical antecedents of this right are the commission of jail delivery and the
1679 English Habeas Corpus Act, 31 Car. 11, ch. 2 (1679). United States v. Provoo, 17
F.R .D. 183, 196-97 (D. Md. 1955).
8. See F. HEL.R, THE SxxTr AMENDMENT 61 (1951).
9. Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905).
10. E.g., State v. O'Leary, 25 N.J. 104, 135 A.2d 321 (1957) (conviction for second.degree
murder affirmed because defendant failed to show how his defense was prejudiced by
delay; trial had been delayed 22 years). See Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial,
51 VA. L. Rv. 1587, 1591-92 (1965).
11. It is easy for the individual to discover that he has waived his right to a speedy
trial. Most jurisdictions hold that unless the accused demands a speedy trial, he has
waived his right. E.g., United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 858
U.S. 880 (1958) (five-year delay found unreasonable, but no dismissal since defendant had
not properly asserted his right to a speedy trial). The type of demand required under this
"demand doctrine" varies. Typically the courts require that "a demand for trial, resistance
to postponement, or some effort to secure a speedy trial on the part of the accused, should
be shown to entitle him to a discharge on the grounds of delay." State v. Lamphere, 20
S.D. 98, 102, 104 N.W. 1038, 1040 (1905). There are some exceptions to this doctrine which
mitigate its harshness for convicts in another jurisdiction. E.g., Taylor v. United States,
238 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (no waiver if the convict does not know of the pending
charge). Yet these exceptions do not exempt all convicts from the requirement that they
must demand speedy trial or waive their right. As a result, the burden of going forward
is shifted from the prosecuting jurisdiction to the convict.
A rapidly growing number of jurisdictions now place the burden of bringing the
accused promptly to trial on the accusing jurisdiction, not on the accused. E.g., People
v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (1955). The courts reason that it was the govern.
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In Klopfer v. North Carolina'2 the Supreme Court signalled a new
judicial attitude toward the right to a speedy trial. The specific holding
in Klopfer advances the rights of convicts facing pending charges in
other jurisdictions in two ways. First, the decision incorporates the
right to a speedy trial under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, thus applying it to the states.23 Second, it undermines the
tradition that the right applies only where the defendant am show
the delay has prejudiced the presentation of his case, and affirms-with
an enthusiasm missing in past decisions-the right's traditional limita-
tions on all unnecessary and oppressive delay.14
The right to a speedy trial has three recognized purposes.13 The first,
often stressed to the exclusion of the other two,'0 is to prevent delay
from hampering the defense as evidence and witnesses disappear,
memories fade, and events lose their perspective.'7 The convict's de-
fense is particularly vulnerable to delay since his imprisonment limits
his ability to keep contact with witnesses and to pursue investigation.' 8
Second, the right to speedy trial attempts to minimize the anxiety
which prosecutors may impose on defendants by public accusation. The
ment which brought the charge in the first place and which has ample powers to bring
the charge to trial. This burden on the accusing jurisdiction has been held to extend to
convicts in another jurisdiction who have made no demand for trial.
12. 586 U.S. 213 (1967). Klopfer had been indicted on a North Carolina criminal
trespass charge arising out of a civil rights demonstration. After his trial ended in a mis-
trial, the case was postponed for two terms. The trial court, over Klopfer's objection, then
granted the prosecutor's motion for a "nolle prosequi with leave," a procedural device
unique to North Carolina whereby the accused is discharged from custody but remains
subject to prosecution at any time in the future at the discretion of the prosecutor.
The United States Supreme Court held, that by indefinitely postponing prosecution
on the indictment over petitioner's objection and without stated justification, the state
denied Klopfer the right of speedy trial guaranteed to him by the sixth and fourteenth
amendments. Chief Justice Warren wrote for himself and six other Justices. Justice
Stewart concurred in the result without an opinion. Justice Harlan accepted the result,
but rejected the implicit "incorporation" doctrine.
13. Id. at 222-23.
14. Id. passim. At no place in the opinion does Chicf Justice Warren refer to any
factor caused by the delay which might prejudice Klopfer's defense. Nor do the circum-
stances of the case suggest any prejudice which might occur. Rather, the finding that the
delay denies Klopfer his right to a speedy trial stems solely from the oppression causzd
by the prosecutor's power to delay trial and the anxiety and concern assodated with
public accusation.
On the importance of the right involved, compare the qualified statement of Beavers v.
Haubert, 198 U.S. 77 (1905), p. 768 supra, with the declaration that "[T]he right to a
speedy trial ... is one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution." Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 586 U.S. 213, 226 (1967).
15. United States v. Ewell, 883 U.S. 116, 120 (1966); People v. Prosser, 809 N.Y. 353, 356,
130 N.E.2d 891, 894 (1955).
16. E.g., State v. O'Leary, 25 NJ. 104, 135 A.2d 321 (1957) (22-year delay not denial of
right to a speedy trial where defendant had failed to show prejudice). See generally Note,
supra note 10, at 1592-97.
17. See cases cited note 15 supra.
18. E.g., Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 259, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1956); United States v.
Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 203 (D. Md. 1955).
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Supreme Court re-emphasized this purpose in Klopfer, finding a denial
of the right on the ground that delaying trial was oppressive, rather
than on any finding of prejudice to the defendant."9 The convict
may arguably suffer less than other citizens from the anxiety of public
accusation,20 but for him the tangible consequences of accusation, in
terms of his treatment while in prison, may well be greater.21 In addi-
tion, pending charges reduce the prisoner's incentive to rehabilitate
himself, since he can look forward only to delivery to the other jurisdic-
tion for trial, not to release, when his present sentence ends.22
Finally, the right to speedy trial protects the accused from prolonged
imprisonment on an untried charge.2 3 While the convict in another
jurisdiction is already imprisoned for some other crime, delaying his
trial on the pending charge may have results similar to imprisonment
on an untried accusation.2 4 Jurisdictions commonly make agreements
which permit sentences handed down by both to be served concur.
rently in one.2 5 Yet the convict loses the benefit of such agreements
when the trial in the second jurisdiction is delayed.20 In contrast, a
defendant charged with separate offenses in a single jurisdiction retains
the right to a speedy trial on the second charge when convicted of the
first,27 and often receives concurrent sentences if he is convicted of
both.28
19. See note 14 sdpra.
20. See Koenig v. Willingham, 824 F.2d 62, 64 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 958
(1964).
21. The accusation usually is accompanied by a detainer with all its burdens. See TAN
29-32 infra. Even if there is no detainer, pending charges may adversely influenca the
convict's treatment at the hands of the correctional authorities.
22. Bennett 21; REPoRT oF CALiFOANIA ASSEMBLY INTMRUM CoMMrrEI ON CRIMINAL
PRocEDURE, 22 ASSEMBLY INmxuAt CoamrrrEz Rzpors, No. 3, at 158-59 (1963).
23. Cases cited note 15 supra.
24. See Barker v. Municipal Court, 64 Cal. 2d 806, 81a, 415 P.2d 809, 814, 51 Cal. Rptr.
921, 926 (1966). This similarity only goes so far. Given the presumption of innocence,
imprisonment on a pending charge is a more serious constitutional concern than Imprison-
ment on a sentence imposed after trial and conviction.
25. For a person convicted of federal charges, the Attorney General has power to
incarcerate him in a state prison where his sentence can run concurrently with an existing
state sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b) (Supp. II 1965-66). This discretion is used by the At-
torney General. Bennett 21. See Goodwin v. Looney, 250 F.2d 72 (10th Cir. 1957). States
may allow the person to serve his state sentence concurrently in the federal correctional
facility. See Bennett 21.
For a person convicted of charges in more than one state, most jurisdictions allow con-
current sentencing. E.g., In re Patterson, 64 Cal. 2d 857, 361-62, 411 P.2d 897, 899-900, 4) Cal.
Rptr. 801, 803-04 (1966). Some states are now signatories to out-of-state incarceration
agreements, such as the New England Corrections Compact. MAmnNo ON AGRr.MENT 4.
26. While the judge who is sentencing the convict on the charge which had been de-
layed may take the earlier sentence into account, his latitude to reduce the later sentence
is limited where conviction for the offense carries a minimum sentence. S. RuniN, Tin
LA,w oF CRiMiNAL ComtrEcoN 119-20 (1963).
27. E.g., Frankel v. Woodrough, 7 F.2d 796, 798 (8th Cir. 1925); Jacobson v. Winter, 91
Idaho 11, 14-16, 415 P.2d 297, 299-300 (1966).
28. See S. RuBIN, supra note 26, at 415-16.
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A convict's sentence can be further lengthened and made more severe
when a jurisdiction with charges pending against him files a detainer-
a warrant notifying the incarcerating authorities of the pending charge,
and requesting notice to the accusing jurisdiction of the prisoner's date
of release2 9 While detainers impose no legal obligation on the incar-
cerating jurisdiction, they are usually honored. 0 The effect often is that
the convict is confined under maximum security and loses prison
privileges.31 He may be ineligible for parole.32
II. Present Law
A. Majority Rule
When one jurisdiction has brought charges against a person serving
a sentence in another jurisdiction, many courts still adhere to the once
unanimous rule that the first jurisdiction need make no attempt to try
the convict promptly. 3 Prosecutors normally take advantage of the
rule to delay trial until the convict has served his sentence in the other
jurisdiction. 4
Supporters of the majority rule urge a number of justifications for
this exception to the normal principle requiring prompt trial. First,
they cite the well settled rule that one jurisdiction cannot compel
another to release a convict for trial. 0 Given this rule, they argue that
a "sovereign" (the requesting jurisdiction) should not be forced to
request what need not be granted to it (temporary custody of the de-
fendant), thus opening itself up to the "insult" of refusal. 0
While such notions of sovereign dignity are anachronistic, the argu-
ment may have had some practical basis in the past when extradition
29. See United States v. Candelaria, 131 F. Supp. 797, 802-05 (SD. Cal. 1955), for an
excellent discussion of detainers and their evils. Cf. CouNcm oF STATE Gon.';mmwrs, Suc-
GESTzD STATE LEGISLATION 167 (1959) [hereinafter cited as SuGGmEE LxctsL4ToN].
30. Note, Detainers and the Correctional Process, 1966 W'As. U.LQ. 417, 418-19.
31. Id.; Donnelly, The Connecticut Board of Parole, 32 CoNN, B.J. 26, 45-48 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Donnelly]; see United States ex rel. Giovengo v. Maroney 194 F. Supp.
154, 156 (WM). Pa. 1961).
32. Some jurisdictions no longer treat detainers as an automatic bar to parole. They
might seek to have the filing jurisdiction withdraw the detainer or will parole the convict
to the detainer. Bennett 21-22.
33. See, eg., Ruip v, Commonwealth, 415 S.W.2d 372 (Ky. 1967); Dreadfulwater v. State,
415 P.2d 493 (Okla. Crim. 1966); Cooper v. Texas, 400 S.W.Id 890 (Tex. 196).
34. See TAN 43-47 infra.
35. For state demand on Federal Government, see, e.g., Abelman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 505 (1858). For federal demand on state, see, e.g., Ex partl Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
103 (1845). For state demand on state, see, e.g., Kentudcy v. Dennizon, 65 U.S. (24 How.)
66 (1860).
36. See, e.g., Cooper v. Texas, 400 S.V.2d 890, 892 (rex. 1966).
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was at best a tricky affair. Extradition procedures were complicated,8 7
and it was often held that a state permanently waived jurisdiction over
a convict whom it released into the custody of another state.88 However,
the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, now in force in all but six
states, today provides for a safe and simple extradition procedure be-
tween states. 9 Statutory and case law has similarly simplified the
process of granting temporary custody between state and federal juris.
dictions.40 These procedural reforms leave little force in an argument
which elevates the small danger of a rebuff of one sovereign by another
above the concrete evils which can result from denial of a speedy trial.
Courts have also justified delayed trial of convicts in other jurisdic-
tions on the ground that these convicts have fled the accusing jurisdic.
tion, and hence waived their right to speedy trial.41 In the case of
convicts arrested and convicted on a federal charge without ever leaving
the accusing state, the argument rests on a patent fiction. But even
where the convict has in fact fled to avoid prosecution and been con-
victed of another crime elsewhere, there seems little reason to hold
this a perpetual waiver of his sixth amendment right, since the accus-
ing jurisdiction can obtain custody simply and efficiently through
statutory procedures.42
Apart from conceptualism and lingering fictions, the true reasons for
delaying trial of convicts in other jurisdictions are punishment, con-
venience, and cost. Punitive motives often predominate. One prose-
cutor wrote that a convict could "sit and rot in prison" rather than be
brought promptly to trial in the prosecutor's jurisdiction.4 3 Presumably
37. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL 10(1955).
38. See, e.g., In re Jones, 154 Kan. 589, 121 P.2d 219 (1942); see also 4 N.Y.L.F. 242
(1958).
39. Comment, The Detainer System and the Right to a Speedy Trial, 31 U. Cu. L. Rmv
535, 549 (1964); see COUNCIL OF STATE GOvFRNbIENTs, HANDBOOK ON INTEMTATE CMhUSE
CONTROL 128-57 (1966).
40. For trying federal convicts on state charges, 18 U.S.C. § 4085(a) (1964) gives the
Attorney General statutory authority to surrender the convicts temporarily. The usual
procedure, however, is for the Federal Government to maintain custody but produce the
convict for trial. United States Bureau of Prisons, Conditions Governing the Production
of a United States Prisoner Upon a Writ of Habeas Corpus Issuing Out of a State Court,
April 19, 1966. See, e.g., Norman v. State, 54 Del. 359, 177 A.2d 347 (1962). To ease trans-
portation problems, the Federal Government will customarily transfer the convict to the
federal correctional facility nearest to the place of trial. Cf. Barker v. Municipal Court,
64 Cal. 2d 806, 815, 415 P.2d 809, 815, 51 Cal. Rptr. 921, 927 (1966).
For trying state convicts on federal charges, see Comment, supra note 89, at 541-44,
41. E.g., Dreadfulwater v. State, 415 P2d 493 (Okla. Crim. 1966).
42. See notes 39-40 supra; see also SUGGESTED LEGISLATION 81-90, which gives the Agree-
ment on Detainers discussed pp. 774-75 infra.
43. Barker v. Municipal Court, 64 Cal. 2d 806, 815, 415 P.2d 809, 815, 51 Cal. Rptr. 921,
927 (1966).
772
Vol. 77: 767, 1968
Speedy Trial
most prosecutors are not so callous, but many prosecutors are doubtless
little troubled by the realization that delay causes anxiety, makes the
convict's eventual defense more difficult, and eliminates the possibility
of concurrent sentences. Many detainers are apparently filed for punitive
reasons; they are withdrawn shortly before the convict's release, having
served their purpose by curtailing prison privileges and preventing
parole.44 Satisfaction of the punitive impulse is, of course, no justifica-
tion for permitting prosecutors to delay trials of convicts in other
jurisdictions.
In addition to satisfying the retributive urge, delaying the trials of
convicts in other jurisdictions is convenient for overworked prosecutors
who welcome the chance to postpone some cases on a typically crowded
docket.45 Yet docket-lightening considerations do not override the right
to a speedy trial of other defendants;40 there seems no good reason why
it should relieve prosecutors of the obligation to try convicts in other
jurisdictions promptly.
Finally, the majority rule is rationalized on the grounds that securing
temporary custody of the defendant and transporting him to and from
trial costs money.47 Extending the right of speedy trial to convicts in
other jurisdictions would force the accusing jurisdiction to spend
this money or drop the charges.
The costs of temporary extradition usually are not substantial, how-
ever,48 and the accusing jurisdiction will face many of the same costs if
it brings the convict to trial after his sentence in the other jurisdiction
has run. Moreover, if the convict can serve his sentences concurrently,
the total cost of his imprisonment and rehabilitation will often be
much smaller. Even aside from this possibility, however, recognition of
the right of speedy trial will certainly cost less than the enforcement of
other rights, such as the right to counsel,40 which can no longer be
distinguished as more "basic" after Klopfer o
44. Donnelly 47; cf. Bennett 2.
45. Note, supra note g0, at 418.
46. See, e.g., Norton v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 65, 411 P.2d 170 (1966) (dismissed case
on statutory grounds, but expressly recognized that statute implements the constitutional
right). See generally sources cited note 66 infra.
47. See, e.g., Dreadfulwater v. State, 415 P.2d 493 (Okla. Crim. 1966).
48. Cf. State ex rel. Fredenberg v. Byrne, 20 Wim 2d 504, 512, 123 N.W.2d 305, 309(1963). Improved procedures have minimized administrative costs. See p. 772 supra.
When jurisdictions are dose together, transportation costs will be insubstantial. There
has been a suggestion for the convict to serve his second sentence first, thus reducing
transportation costs. MEErING ON AGaEErENTr 2-3.
49. See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335 (1963); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
50. "[Tjhe right to a speedy trial ... is one of the most basic rights preserved by our
Constitution." 386 US. at 226.
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B. Minority Rule
In response to arguments for extending the right to speedy trial to
convicts in other jurisdictions, a growing number of courts require the
accusing jurisdiction to use reasonable means to obtain temporary
custody of the convict against whom it has charges pending.5' The
rule's serious flaw is its provision that the refusal of the incarcerating
jurisdiction to yield the convict is a valid ground for delaying trial
until his sentence has ended 2 Such refusals are not uncommon.63 The
incarcerating jurisdiction may fear that the convict will not be re-
turned after trial or that he will escape.Y4 Or the jurisdiction may refuse
when the convict is serving a life term, overlooking the fact that his
sentence may later be upset or commuted, so that he might have to
face trial after a long delay. 5
The minority rule encourages these refusals. Since the incarcerating
jurisdiction knows that the accusing jurisdiction can always try the con.
vict later, it feels little incentive to shoulder the administrative burdens
and risk of escape involved in rendition. Further, authorities in the
incarcerating jurisdiction know that a requesting prosecutor, in spite of
his exercise of the "reasonable diligence" required by the courts, shares
their willingness to delay trial.';
C. The Agreement on Detainers
The major legislative response to the problem of speedy trials for
defendants serving sentences in other jurisdictions is the Agreement on
Detainers,5 7 promulgated in 1957 and since then adopted by 20 states.68
51. E.g., People v. Bryarly, 23 II. 2d 313, 178 N.E.2d 326 (1961); Commonwealth v.
McGrath, 348 Mass. 748, 205 N.E.2d 710 (1965); Barker v. Municipal Court, 64 Cal. 2d 806,
415 P.2d 809, 51 Cal. Rptr. 921 (1966).
52. See cases cited note 51 supra.
53. For common reasons for refusal, see the text infra. Sometimes the reason Is not
dear. E.g., People v. South, 122 Cal. App. 505, 508-09, 10 P.2d 109, 111 (1932) (no denial
of right to speedy trial when federal authorities refused to grant temporary custody; ac.
cused was indicted for murder by California, but was serving a 10-year federal sentence),
Kirby v. Warden of the 'Aid. Penitentiary, 214 'Aid. 600, 133 A.2d 421 (1957) (similar un-
explained refusal by federal authorities).
54. S. RuBiN, supra note 26, at 421.
55. E.g., Wzesinki v. Amos, 143 F. Supp. 585 (N.D. Ind. 1956) (no denial of speedy trial
when defendant brought to trial in 1956 on 1948 federal indictment).
56. See pp. 772-73 supra for prosecutor's motives.
57. SUGGEsTE LEGISLATION 81-90.
58. California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mon.
tana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Penngylvania,
and South Carolina. MEErING oN AGREMENT 1. Minnesota, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont,
and W ashington. Council of State Governments, Tally Sheet No. 12: Compact Develop-
ments in the States, October 1, 1967.
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The Agreement provides that, once the charging state has filed a de-
tainer with the incarcerating state, the convict may demand a trial; tie
charging state must normally bring him to trial within 180 days after
receiving his demand or face dismissal of the charges with prejudice;
finally, the incarcerating state agrees to deliver the convict for trial.0
The Agreement provides procedures for the defendant's demand, and
his delivery by the incarcerating jurisdiction, all designed to ensure
trial within a very short time. o The generally successful experience
under the Agreement demonstrates that such procedures are workable.01
The Agreement falls short in two ways of being a comprehensive
guarantee of the right to a speedy trial. 2 First, 30 states and the federal
government have not enacted it,03 and its procedures are effective only
when both the accusing and the incarcerating jurisdictions are signa-
tories.64 Second, it applies only when a detainer has been filed. 0 The
primary emphasis of the proponents of the Agreement was on the anti-
rehabilitative effect of long-standing detainers, not on the other
purposes of the right to speedy trial-protection of the defendant
against prejudice of his defense, the anxiety of a pending charge, and
extended incarceration. A prosecutor wishing to circumvent the re-
quirements of the Agreement can do so by waiting until the prisoner
is about to be released before filing the detainer.
59. Articles III & V, SuGGE-sED LEGISLATION 84-87.
60. Id. The Agreement also provides for the case of the accusing jurisdiction requesting
custody of the defendant. Here there is a 30-day period during which the Governor of the
imprisoning state may disapprove the request. Once the requesting jurisdiction obtains
custody of the convict he must be brought to trial within 120 days. Article lV, SuCEsTED
LEGISLATION 86-87. See the extensive discussion of forms and administrative procedures
under the Agreement in CouNCIL OF STATE GOVEENMENTS, HANDBOOK ON INTEFt5TATE Cnrd,
CONTROL 91-116 (1966).
61. MEETING ON AGREEnENT passim.
62. The lad of dear sanctions against the negligence of the correctional authorities in
the incarcerating jurisdiction also limits the comprehensiveness of the Agreement. If
these authorities fail to inform the convict of the detainer and his rights under the Agree-
ment or fail to forvard promptly the conict's demand for trial to the accusing jurisdic-
tion, the Agreement does not make dear what, if any, sanctions are available. Compare
State v. West, 79 N.J. Super. 579, 191 A.2d 758 (1963) with People v. Esposito, 37 Misc. 2d
386, 238 N.Y.S.2d 460 (Queens County Ct. 1960).
63. This inaction is in spite of well-publicized efforts prior to promulgation of the
Agreement, e.g., COuNcIL OF STATE GovERNmETs, SENTENCING AND REn.SE oF Pimsons
AccusED OF MuLTnLE OrruNszs (1955), and the subsequent lapse of over 10 years. The
opposition of prosecutors is apparently a major factor in this lack of acceptance. Bennett
23. The Federal Government, which files a substantial proportion of the detainers, shows
little inclination to become a signatory. At the request of the Administration, Representa-
tive Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, introduced the Agree-
ment as a proposed bill. H.R. 8365, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). No action was taken.
Letter from Representative Celler, November 9, 1967, on file in Yale Law Journal office.
64. E.g., Zimmerman v. Superior Court, 248 Cal. App. 2d 56, 56 Cal. Rptr. 226 (197).
65. Articles M11(a) and IV(a), SUGGEMTED LEsGILATIoN 84-86.
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III. Proposed Limitations on Post-Charge Delay
As revitalized in Klopfer, the right to a speedy trial suggests mini-
mum limitations on the power of a jurisdiction to delay the trial of an
out-of-jurisdiction convict against whom it has formal charges pending.
Limitations on the power to delay formal charges against these con-
victs are suggested later.
First, the period allowed between the time the individual begins serv-
ing his sentence in the incarcerating jurisdiction and the beginning of
his trial in the accusing jurisdiction should be no longer than the period
which the sixth amendment would allow between charge and trial for
a defendant held in the accusing jurisdiction. Second, refusal by the
incarcerating jurisdiction to grant custody of the defendant should not
be grounds for permitting the accusing jurisdiction to try him after
his sentence has run, if the period of delay would otherwise be constitu-
tionally impermissible. Finally, doctrines of waiver of the right to a
speedy trial should be brought into line with the body of modern
waiver law.
A. Beginning and Length of the Period of Delay
The first suggestion responds to two questions: when should the
right to a speedy trial commence, and how long a delay is allowable.
In the normal situation, where the accused is within the accusing
jursidiction, the right to a speedy trial runs from the date of the
arrest" or formal charge. 7 Where the accused is held for trial by
another jurisdiction, this rule should be modified to recognize the
legitimate interests of that jurisdiction. It would be unreasonable for
the first or accusing jurisdiction to expect temporary custody of the
defendant while the second jurisdiction, which holds the accused, is
completing the process of trial and sentencing, thereby meeting its
duty to try the accused promptly. Even after sentencing, the defendant
may be free on bail pending appeal and may need to remain in the
second jurisdiction to consult with his lawyer. Thus it seems reason.
able to measure the accused's right to a speedy trial in the first juris-
66. See Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 57 CoLubr. L. REv. 846 (1957); Note, supra
note 10, at 1587. Since arrest on another charge by another jurisdiction does not con-
stitute arrest on the pending charge, the formal charge is the only traditional starting
point applicable to the convict.
67. By formal charge is meant an indictment, information, or complaint. Not all juris-
dictions accept the complaint as the starting point for the right; some require an infornia-
tion or indictment. For complaint, see, e.g., Rost v. Municipal Court, 184 Cal. App. 2d 507,
7 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1960). Even a detainer warrant has been declared the starting point.
People v. Winfrey, 20 N.Y.2d 138, 228 N.E.2d 808, 281 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1967).
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diction from the date he begins serving his sentence in the second or
incarcerating jurisdiction.68
The accusing jurisdiction may on occasion argue that its duty to
try the accused promptly should commence at a later date, claiming
that it had no notice of the defendant's whereabouts when he began
serving his sentence. However, the extensive national system of re-
porting wanted persons and convicts gives the jurisdiction access to
knowledge of convicts' whereabouts.09 A flat rule that the jurisdiction
has constructive notice at the time the accused begins serving his
sentence would properly put the burden of improving this system on
the jurisdictions which have the power to modify it. If the right to
speedy trial began only when the accusing jurisdiction had actual no-
tice, the defendant would face the almost impossible task of refuting
the state's claim that it had no knowledge of his whereabouts.
As for the allowable period of pre-trial delay, other commentators
have already discussed the factors which should determine this period
in the normal case of an individual imprisoned in the accusing juris-
diction.70 For this Note, the only further question is whether the fact
that the accused is a convict in another jurisdiction is itself a relevant
factor which might shorten or lengthen the permissible period.7 ' It
68. If the individual, before becoming a convict, had been indicted while he was in the
accusing jurisdiction and was available for trial for a period before leaving that jurisdic-
tion, that period might also be counted in determining whether there was undue delay.
However, the harms to the individual might often be less severe during this period. See
pp. 769-71. On the other hand, to include any of the period during which the convict
was outside the jurisdiction and not a prisoner or could not be apprehended by reasonable
means would encourage flight.
69. Letter from New York Attorney General's office, November 28, 1967, on file in
Yale Law Journal office. Law enforcement agencies widely publish their "wanted persons"
lists. Correctional facilities circulate reports on those who are serving sentences. These
agencies have access to the FBI's centralized system which daily collects and checks
thousands of fingerprints. $3 FBI LAw ENF RCEENT BULLETIN, NO. 7, at 3 (1904). The
great number of detainers filed against convicts by other jur'dictions attests to the
effectiveness of this reporting system. See note 1 supra.
70. Courts consider whether the delay was reasonable in light of all the circumstances.
This vague measure is clarified somewhat by case law which has delineated the circum-
stances which are valid reasons for delay. A constitutional violation is seldom found
unless the delay lasts over a year. See sources cited note 66 supra.
The permissible delay should become shorter, given the recent re-.mphasis of the in-
portance of the right and all its purposes, not just preventing prejudice to the accused's
defense. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 586 U.S. 213 (1967). Further, courts in the past could
usually dismiss when there were shorter delays on grounds of the speedy trial statutes,
which usually allow delay of 180 days or less. See, e.g., CAX PENAL CODE § 1382 (West Supp.
1967) (if not in custody, 60 days after indictment or information). See also Note, supra
note 4, at 837-41. Since these statutes generally do not apply to convicts in other jurrdic.
tions, the courts will not be able to rely on this intermediate ground and will be more
likely to employ the constitutional right.
71. The courts upholding the minority rule fail to agree on a starting point for measur-
ing delay, if they have considered the problem at all. Some look to the time when the
accused's whereabouts become known. See, e.g., People v. Bryarly, 23 IIl. 2d 313, 318, 178
N.E.2d 326, 329 (1961). One court even includes the period the accused was awaiting dis-
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should be expected that the delay allowed will often be shorter, since,
as has been noted before, the consequences of delay for the convict in
another jurisdiction are often more severe than those suffered by other
individuals whose trials are delayed.7 2
The arguments for allowing additional delay for convicts in other
jurisdictions should, with one exception, be rejected, As argued above,
the costs of securing custody,73 the convenience of the prosecutor7 4
and lack of notice of the convict's whereabouts75 do not justify such
delay. Nor should the fact that paperwork and logistics take time be
a reason for additional delay. This is a mechanical process which,
under modern statutory procedures, should take a few months at
most.78 It can be accomplished during the period already allowed for
preparation of the prosecution and court calendar delay.77
In one situation, courts should perhaps be more lenient in allowing
pre-trial delay than they would be in the case of a defendant within
the accusing jurisdiction. Where the defendant's sentence has only a
short time to run, a judge should hesitate to dismiss"8 a charge because
a prosecutor waited the few extra months until the end of the sentence
to request extradition, especially if the distance between the jurisdic-
tions is great and the delay did not unduly prejudice or burden the
defendant.7 9
B. Refusal and Waiver
The second suggestion strengthens the current minority rule by
eliminating the incarcerating jurisdiction's refusal to surrender the
defendant as a valid excuse for a delayed trialso Such a rule will pro.
position of charges in the other jurisdiction. People v. Piscitello, 7 N.Y.2d 387, 165 N.E,2d
849, 198 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1960).
72. See pp. 769-71 supra.
73. See p. 773 supra.
74. See p. 773 supra.
75. see p. 777 supra.
76. See p. 772 supra. Lucas v. United States, 363 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1966), provhles
an example of the rapidity of present procedures of extradition. Over his objection which
forced a hearing, defendant was extradited iii one month.
77. See note 70 supra.
78. Dismissal, the sanction recommended here, is the usual sanction against violation
of the constitutional right of speedy trial. Note, sApra note 66, at 859. Further, thig dis-
missal should act as a bar to future prosecutions for the same offense. This is also tie
usual sanction and cogent arguments have been raised in its support. If the prosecutor
could re-chArge the convict, he would be able easily to circumvent the right and would
have no incentive to try the convict promptly. See sources cited note 66 supra; Mann v.
United States, 304 F,2d 394, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (dictum).
79. Cf. United Sthtes v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 804, 807-08 (2d Cir. 1964).
80. See p. 774 supra.
778
Vol. 77: 767, 1968
Speedy Trial
vide an incentive for the incarcerating jurisdiction to yield temporary
custody of the defendant. Refusal will no longer mean simply a delayed
trial in the requesting jurisdiction; it will mean dismissal of the
charges. A refusing jurisdiction will have to fear retaliatory refusals
in the future by the requesting jurisdiction. In non-convict situations,
jurisdictions are deterred from exercising their privilege to deny re-
quests for extradition by this same fear of retaliation."'
There remains at least the possibility that an incarcerating juris-
diction might refuse to grant temporary custody of a convict even
when dismissal of the charge is the result. If the convict is one whom
the incarcerating jurisdiction would refuse to extradite even after he
was released, the accusing jurisdiction will suffer no additional loss
by the earlier refusal, and the convict will be relieved of the threat
of a future trial earlier.3 2 If the incarcerating jurisdiction would ex-
tradite the convict upon release but is unwilling to yield custody
while he is serving his sentence, its reasons for refusing the request
must arise from the administrative burdens of granting temporary
custody. Given the simple procedures now available for temporary
extradition,s3 allowing such minor administrative burdens to over-
ride the convict's interest in a speedy trial does not seem reasonable.
If the incarcerating jurisdiction's refusal unfairly disregards the in-
terests of the accusing jurisdiction, the solution lies in reform of the
statutory or constitutional law of interstate rendition, not in thwart-
ing the defendant's rights.
Finally, archaic doctrines which hold that convicts waive their right
to speedy trial unless they affirmatively oppose the prosecutor's delays4
should be abandoned. These doctrines run squarely against the con-
temporary law for waiver of constitutional rights8s Waiver should be
found only where the convict intentionally abandons the right with
a full understanding of the implications of his decision. 0
81. See generally Note, Interstate Rendition: Executive Practices and the Effects of
Discretion, 66 YALE L.J. 97 (1956).
82. Id. passim, for examples of refusals to extradite non-convicts.
83. See p. 772 supra.
84. See note 11 supra.
85. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US. 458, 464 (1938) (sixth amendment right to
counsel): "'Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and ... do not presume acquiesence in the lon of fundamental
rights:" Fay v. Nola, 372 US. 891 (1963); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436 (19O).
86. See sources dted note 85 supra.
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IV. Pre-Charge Delay 7
Even if the proposals sketched above are implemented as constitu-
tional requirements, the right to a speedy trial of a convict alleged
to have committed a crime in another jurisdiction will be insecure.
These proposals, in line with the traditional law s8 of speedy trial,
regulate only delay between charge and trial. A prosecutor wishing
to delay trial can evade the proposed rules by not bringing charges
against the convict until shortly before the end of his sentence. 80 Stat-
utes of limitations provide no protection against this practice; con-
victs in other jurisdictions are universally held to be "fugitives" from
the accusing jurisdiction, a status which tolls statutes of limitations.0
Traditionally, courts have held that statutes of limitations are the
"exclusive" protection against pre-charge (and, its functional equiva-
lent, pre-arrest) delay; the right to speedy trial has nothing to do with
it.91 Yet a delay in filing charges often involves the very harms which
87. This section deals with delay before the initial charge. It also includes delay be-
tween the initial charge and a related charge which might be brought later if the Initial
charge is dismissed or upset (by direct or collateral attack). See note 94 infra.
It does not include the situation where the defendant is re-charged for the same offense
after an indictment has been dismissed. To the extent that courts allow re-charging at all,
they treat the proceedings as a totality, considering the whole period after the initial
charge as the post-charge period. E.g., United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120-21 (1966);
see sources cited note 66 supra.
88. See p. 776 supra. The Agreement on Detainers provides no protection in the
pre-charge period; it covers only detainers "based on untried indictments, informations, or
complaints." SUGGEsTED LEGISLATION 84. See generally Note, Justice Overdue: Speedy Trial
for the Potential Defendant, 5 STAN. L. REv. 95 (1952).
89. Delaying charges against convicts in other jurisdictions as a tactic to delay trid waS
not necessary before the minority rule. However, as jurisdictions adopt the minority rule
(or enact the Agreement on Detainers), prosecutors will presumably resort to this tactic.
See cases cited note 112 infra.
90. Taylor v. United States, 238 F2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1956). Intent in leaving the juris-
diction is held to be unimportant. It is argued that the person who leaves the jurisdiction
is harder to locate and is unavailable for questioning. The reasoning is hard to accept for
all convicts in another jurisdiction. They are usually located very easily. When they are in
a federal prison within the very state that will charge them, or are in a nearby state, It
strains credibility to say they are unavailable for questioning. Cf. 104 U. PA. L. REV. 1111
(1956). Yet, even if the applicable statute of limitations were extended to these convicts,
the protection offered would be scanty. The statutes of limitations allow long delays for
some crimes and often have no limits for the more serious offenses. Note, The Statute of
Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to Prosecution, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 630
(1954). Moreover, these statutes are expressions of legislative policy, changeable at will by
the legislature. See, e.g., Chase Securities v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945). There
is no reason they need be the standard in ruling upon constitutional claims. See generally
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Court rejected the suggestion that It should
withhold decision until state legislatures and advisory bodies dealt with the problems by
rule-making: "Mhe issues presented are of constitutional dimensions and must be deter-
mined by the courts." Id. at 490. Their purpose is to set a cut-off date after which prosecu-
tion is barred; they do not have to excuse failure to prosecute at an earlier date.
91. E.g., Harlow v. United States, 301 F.2d 361 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 814
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the right seeks to avoid. Like the convict who has been charged, the
convict who expects to be charged may suffer anxiety which discour-
ages rehabilitation, be prejudiced in his defense, and lose the chance
of obtaining a concurrent sentence. A detainer may be filed against
him, but correctional authorities usually give less weight to detainers
unbacked by formal charges.9 2 If the convict does not expect to be
charged, he of course suffers no anxiety. But he still loses the pos-
sibility of concurrent sentencing and he is especially prejudiced in
preparing his defense, since he has no reason to fix in his memory the
events surrounding the alleged offense or to secure witnesses while
their whereabouts are still known.93
Some courts, including the Supreme Court in United States v. Ewell,"4
have recognized the harmful effects of pre-charge delay and have either
held or implied that constitutional provisions as well as the statutes
of limitations check the power of prosecutors to postpone the arrest
or charging of suspects indefinitely. Some of these courts find this
limitation in the right to a speedy trial.9 In Taylor v. United States,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals considered pre-charge as
well as post-charge delay in finding a violation of the right to a speedy
(1962); United States v. Panczko, 367 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009
(1967).
92. See Bennett 20-21.
93. See Judge Wright's concurring opinion in Nickens v. United States, 323 F.Id 803,
812 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 905 (1964).
94. 383 U.S. 116 (1966). When the two defendants succeeded through collateral attack in
getting their original convictions vacated, the Federal Government promptly reindicted
them. The new indictments contained three counts, one being the same as the initial
charge against the defendants, another for a related but lesser offense. The district court,
holding that the defendants had been denied their right to a speedy trial, dismLsed the
indictments. The Supreme Court reversed.
In considering whether delay in bringing the related charge was a violation of the right
to a speedy trial, the Supreme Court treated the delay as pre-charge delay and, in doing
so, did not say the right was inapplicable. Rather the Court noted that the applicable
statute of limitations was the "primary" guaranty against state criminal charges, id. at
122, a sharp contrast to earlier decisions of federal courts of appeals that the statutes of
limitations "exclusively" controlled. E.g., Harlow v. United States, 301 F.2d 961, 366 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 814 (1962). Further, the Court proceeded to ei-luate the pre-
charge delay by the traditional speedy trial standards of whether the delay i-as "prejudicial
and oppressive." 383 U.S. at 122. Thus, while the Court found no violation of the right
to speedy trial, it dearly implied that the right applies to the pre-charge period.
95. See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (discussed p. 782
infra); United States v. Burke, 224 F. Supp. 41 (D.D.C. 1963) (indictment dismissed; delay
was measured from the offense).
See also Lucas v. United States, 363 F.2d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 1966 (dictum that right may
apply in special circumstances to earlier period than formal accusation); United States v.
Rivera, 346 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1965) (implied that right might be applicable to the pre.
charge period); United States v. Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196 (D.D.C. 1965) (indictment dis.
missed under Rule 48(b) for unreasonable delay between offense and trial; court indicates
dismissal could have been on grounds that the defendants right to a speedy trial had
been violated).
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trial of a defendant who had been a convict in another jurisdiction
during most of the period.96
While the D.C. Court of Appeals has subsequently limited the im-
plications of Taylor,97 it now employs the due process clause to limit
pre-charge delay.98 In narcotics cases based on the evidence of under-
cover agents, the court has dismissed charges resting on a single sale
of drugs months before the arrest, when the arrest was delayed to pro.
tect the undercover agent's cover, and where the passage of time might
have destroyed evidence useful to the defendant or blurred his mem-
ory. 9
9
The right to a speedy trial seems a more appropriate vehicle than
the due process clause to curb the abuses of pre-charge or pre-arrest
delay. The due process clause focuses on the single element of preju-
dice to the defendant's case caused by lapse of time, while the speedy
trial provision allows considerations of the other factors which may
make delay oppressive, factors particularly relevant in the case of con.
victs in another jurisdiction. 100
96. 238 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (51/2 years delay between offense and trial, Including
more than three years' pre-indictment delay).
97, See Nickens v. United States, 828 F.2d 808, 810 nn.l-2 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cart. denied,
379 U.S. 905 (1964).
98. See, e.g., Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (seven-month
delay between offense and arrest); Woody v. United States, 370 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(four-month delay). See generally 80 HAnv. L. R y. 1361 (1967); Note, Constitutional Limits
on Pre-Arrest Delay, 51 IowA L. REv. 670 (1966).
Why the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia switched to the due process
clause and now uses it as the doctrinal basis for limiting pre-charge delay is not clear.
See generally Nickens v. United States, 323 F.2d 808, 810 nn.1-2 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cort.
denied, 379 U.S. 905 (1964). Precedent is apparently a major factor. The right to a speedy
trial is burdened with extensive precedent holding the right inapplicable to the pre-charge
period. See p. 776 supra. On the other hand, precedent for using the due proces clause
was favorable, including a comfortably old English case. The Queen v. Robbins, 1 Cox
Crim. Cas. 114 (Somerset Winter Assizes 1844). Further, due process is traditionally quite
flexible and applications of it in other areas provide helpful analogies.
Courts in some states and federal circuits blur these two constitutional provisions.
United States v. Harbin, 377 F.2d 78, 79-80 (4th Cir. 1967), amply illustrates this point.
The defendant in that case claimed that a five-month delay between his alleged offense
and a warrant for his arrest was denial of his right to a speedy trial. The court recog-
nized that there was a constitutional question at stake, analogized the question of delay
to situations where there was delay after the prosecution had been initiated (i.e., speedy
trial right?) and then cited and considered extensively Ross and Woody, which were de-
cided solely on due process grounds.
Some courts have openly confessed this fuzziness and justified it by saying there Is
little analytical difference between the two provisions. See, e.g., People v. Winfrey, 20
N.Y.2d 138, 228 N.E.2d 808, 281 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1967).
99. See the District of Columbia Circuit cases cited note 98 supra.
100. Presumably, due process analysis would not find unreasonable an extended delay
where the evidence against the convict is very strong and of a permanent nature, even
though the anxiety stemming from the delay severely hampers the convict's rehabllitaton
and a detainer filed against him causes his prison privileges and chances of parole to be
curtailed. Such situations as the above would be frequently encountered. Prejudice caused
by delay would be hard to establish, for example, where the convict had made an ex-
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Courts which have refused to apply the sixth amendment or similar
state provisions to pre-charge and pre-arrest delay have relied heavily
on the specious syllogism that the Constitution guarantees the right
to a speedy trial only to "the accused," and that a suspect is not "the
accused" until charges have been brought against him.10' This argu-
ment, however, is vitiated by such cases as Escobedo v. Illinois,102
where the Supreme Court has refused to read "the accused" in any
such narrow sense; while Mr. Justice Stewart still finds indictment
the triggering point for certain constitutional rights, 03 the majority
of the Court has refused to create any such arbitrary watershed in
applying the Bill of Rights.
Given the functional similarity of pre- and post-charge delay and
the demise of the conceptual argument based upon the time of ac-
cusation, the D.C. Court of Appeals appears to have reasoned cor-
rectly in the Taylor case: the right of speedy trial should apply to the
period before charge as well as the period after.
V. Proposed Limitations on Pre-Charge Delay
The conclusion that the sixth amendment applies to pre-charge
delay is the beginning rather than the end of the search for standards
to enforce it. Different factors might condition the right for convicts
in the pre-charge period than apply in the post-charge context. The
state may have interests at stake in pre-charge delay which are more
substantial than those advanced, and rejected above, to justify delay
between charge and trial. The state may delay charge to facilitate its
gathering of evidence against the person to be charged, to facilitate
apprehension of his suspected confederates in crime, or to protect
undercover agents on whose reports the charge may be based.104
tensive confession of the offense, where he has been convicted after long trial for an
offense which arose from the same event as would be the basis for future charges, or
where the offense is one such as income tax evasion or embezzlement in which the evi-
dence is mostly based on written transactions rather than identity of suspects.
101. See, e.g., People v. Jordan, 45 Cal. 2d 697, 708, 290 P.2d 484, 491 (1955).
102. 878 U.S. 478, 485 (1964).
103. Id. at 493-94.
104. Some might further argue that the jurisdiction ought to be allowed additional
delay for bringing related charges when the initial charges against a defendant are dis-
missed or conviction on them is upset (by direct or collateral attack). This argument is
unacceptable; the jurisdiction could have brought all the charges initially. The Supreme
Court in United States v. Ewell, 583 U.S. 116 (1966), implicitly recognized the lack of any
special arguments for delay in such cases. The Court applied traditional speedy.trial
analysis and asked whether the defendants had been prejudiced and oppressed by the
19-month delay between the original arrest and the second indictment. Id. at 122-23.
Accord, United States v. Burke, 224 F. Supp. 41, 46 (D.D.C. 1963) (court dismissed second
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A. The Quantum of Evidence
The first interest, that in gathering evidence against the accused,10 5
will rarely conflict with the convict's interest in a speedy trial. The
convict's interest in being charged and speedily tried by the accusing
jurisdiction does not accrue until he has begun to serve his sentence
in the incarcerating jurisdiction. 00 Between the commission of the
first crime and the beginning of the sentence for the second crime
must ensue arrest, pre-trial procedure, trial and sentencing-a process
which often takes several months.10 7 And yet typically the evidence
for a crime is gathered within hours or at most days after the crime
is detected; 08 thus the accusing jurisdiction will rarely have the ex-
cuse that it is still collecting evidence needed to convict the person
of the first crime by the time the suspect begins his sentence in the
incarcerating jurisdiction.
But the rare case will occur. Sometimes crimes are not detected until
long after they are committed; sometimes the crime is detected early,
but the police do not focus on a suspect until much later; and occa-
sionally a Porfiry Petr6vitch will have his suspect without having the
goods on him. In such instances the prosecutor will argue that he
cannot charge the suspect before the sentence in the other jurisdiction
begins, either because he cannot establish probable cause or, though
there is probable cause, because he needs more evidence to convict-
evidence which might be lost if he tipped his hand by bringing charges.
In cases such as this, determining the time when the accusing juris.
diction's duty to try promptly should begin is difficult. It is clear that
it should not begin before the prosecutor has sufficient evidence to
support charges against the suspect; a defendant should not be able
indictment on speedy trial grounds when prosecutor dismissed first indictment to gain
a supposed advantage with the second indictment for a related offense). Contra, Sanchez
v. United States, 341 F.2d 225, 229 (9th Cir. 1965).
Rather than representing any valid interest, delay in this situation smacks of oppressive
action by the government. The defendant who successfully escapes initial charges is being
harassed with new charges. Cf. Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 286-92 (1965).
Where the conviction has been upset, the jurisdiction is discouraging the exercise of the
defendant's statutory right to seek review of criminal convictions. Ewell v. United States,
383 U.S. 116, 128 (1966) (dissenting opinion of Fortas, J.).
105. Courts sometimes allow the prosecutor additional delay to gather evidence In the
post-charge period. See, e.g., Harlow v. United States, 301 F.2d 861, 367 (5th Cir.), cart.
denied, 371 U.S. 814 (1962) (2-year fruitless search for information about defendants'
Swiss bank accounts held not unreasonable delay). See generally sources cited note 66
supra.
106. See pp. 776-77 supra.
107. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION O1
JusTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: Tim CouRTs 80-90 (1967).
108. See, e.g., TRE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADmINISTItATION
OF JUsTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 7-19, 88-106 (1967); Note, In-
terrogations in New Haven, 76 YALE LJ. 1519, 1597-99 (1967).
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to take advantage of his deceptiveness or luck in avoiding detection
to claim delay. Even if probable cause exists, the Supreme Court has
recently ruled that the police have no duty to arrest a suspect when
they have mere probable cause-they have a legitimate interest in
gathering evidence for trial before they make an arrest (or a formal
charge-the functional equivalent of an arrest in the case of a convict
in another jurisdiction)., 09
The next stopping point, and perhaps the most reasonable one, is
the time at which the police have enough evidence to give reasonable
assurance of conviction.110 Delay in bringing charges after this point,
unless the other justifying circumstances are present, can reasonably
be deemed to be in bad faith-calculated to avoid the constitutional
duty to give the defendant a speedy trial. The standard is necessarily
a vague one, and provides only a starting point for judicial evaluation.
But its vagueness should inflict no substantial harm on the deterrent
effect of law enforcement, since the need to apply it should arise only
in rare cases. Its open texture has certain advantages in giving courts
considerable latitude to look into the underlying issue-the good faith
of the law enforcement agencies.'
Allocation of the burden of proof is important in applying such a
standard. It would be onerous to make the defendant affirmatively
prove the amount of evidence the police had in their possession at
different times in the course of the investigation. Thus in cases which
present a prima facie claim of unconstitutional delay-a substantial
period betveen the offense and the bringing of charges-the state
should bear the burden of showing that essential evidence was gath-
ered shortly before the charges were brought. Probably any material
109. United States v. Hofa, 385 U.S. 293, 309-10 (1966).
110. "A prosecution should not go forward unless there is sufficient evidence against
the accused to promise a conviction, thus justifying the governmental expense and the
defendant's distress." l. PAULSEN & S. KADisH, CRIfINAL LAW AND ITs PnOcsm: CAss AND
MAmums 917 (1962).
111. Besides looking to the delay after the police obtain sufficient evidence, the courts
might on occasion inquire whether the jurisdiction made a reasonably prompt effort to
secure the evidence. Purposeful or negligent delay should weigh heavily for a finding
that speedy trial has been denied the convict. For instance, a cessation or marked slow.-
down in investigatory efforts, espedally after the authorities knew that the suspct was a
convict in another jurisdiction, would suggest the jurisdiction was abusing its dalm of
necessity for securing evidence. Negligence might be found where there are departures
from the general investigatory procedures of the law enforcement agency. Even the gen-
eral procedures might be questioned if viable alternatives exist which substantially reduce
the time needed to secure the evidence.
Instances of bad faith investigatory delay should be rare since the police traditionally
seek to "dear" their cases as quickly as possible. It is after the police obtain sufficient
evidence and turn the case over to the prosecutor that delaying tactics become more
likely.
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evidence gathered at that time should be presumptively considered
"essential," with the burden then shifting to the defendant to show
that the prosecutor already had sufficient evidence to convict. 112
B. Protecting Undercover Agents and Catching Confederates
In some cases, law enforcement agencies will have enough evidence
against a convict in another jurisdiction to assure his conviction, but
will seek to delay charging him on the grounds that bringing charges
would "blow" the cover of an undercover agent,118 or would reduce the
state's chances of collecting evidence against the defendant's suspected
confederates. These cases present the most difficult conflict between
the convict's right to a speedy trial and the jurisdiction's legitimate
interests in law enforcement. Again, they are likely to be relatively
rare cases. They can arise only where the investigation of a conspiracy
runs beyond the time it takes the incarcerating jurisdiction to arrest,
try, and convict the accused,114 or where an informer or agent in the
accusing jurisdiction retains his usefulness through a similar period.
112. Two recent cases reflect the improvement provided by this analysis over past
treatment of the problem of pre-charge delay. In Terlikowski v. United States, 379 F.2d
501 (8th Cir. 1967), a post office had been burglarized and the two defendants were
promptly charged and convicted by Minnesota for armed robbery. It was only after a
delay of two years that the federal government brought three counts arising out of the
same robbery against the defendants. The trial came five months later. In answer to the
defendants' claim that they had suffered because of the pre-charge delay, the court
limited its analysis to whether the defendants' defense had been prejudiced, ignoring the
other interests of the convicts which the right to speedy trial seeks to protect. Further,
the court accepted the prosecution's interest in delay as justified by noting that the
prosecution had continued its investigation and unearthed new evidence. But, given that
the state had convicted the defendants on a charge similar to the Federal Government's
charges, was the additional investigation necessary? The Federal Government did initially
include a conspiracy charge involving other defendants which Minnesota might not
have done in its earlier charge. But did this require more investigation? And, even If
additional investigation were necessary, did these investigations require two years or
could they have been completed more quickly? It is not clear whether the proposed
analysis would lead to a different result in this case, but it clearly would better consider
the valid interests involved.
This analysis would provide a clear-cut answer in State v. Duffy, 24 Conn. Supp, 308,
190 A.2d 243 (Super. Ct. 1963). There, the defendant had been serving a two.year sen.
tence in a federal correctional institution in Connecticut. The day of his release he was
formally charged and arrested by state authorities on charges of auto theft and cscape
from a state jail. Both the offenses and the suspect's whereabouts were known to the state
authorities during his prison term. The state offenses were ones which did not require
delay in order to secure additional evidence nor to protect undercover agents nor to
continue a wide-ranging investigation. Yet, rather than bring the defendant to trial
promptly, the state prosecutor let him sit in the federal institution. This absence of any
valid state interest in delaying prosecution, combined with the defendant's valid interests
in a speedy trial, provided a compelling case for finding a denial of the defendant's right
to a speedy trial. The court never got started. It relied on precedent to hold that the
right only extended from the time of formal accusation.
113. Using the more limited due process analysis, the Court of Appeals for the Dis'
trict of Columbia has been actively considering pre-charge delay in this area. See p. 782
supra.
114. See p. 784 supra.
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And even then the right will not have accrued unless the police in
the accusing jurisdiction had enough evidence to convict by the time
the accused began serving his sentence in the incarcerating jurisdic-
tion.
The first part of the proposed test is similar to that recommended
in the situation where the police are still gathering evidence against
the particular accused person in question. Where a substantial gap
exists between the time of the offense and the time the accusing ju-
risdiction brings the defendant to trial, that jurisdiction bears the
burden of showing the necessity for the delay. The problem is to
determine when a delay is necessary in the informer or confederate
situation.
No clear rule seems appropriate to the situation. On the one hand,
it would undervalue the interest in a speedy trial for the defendant
if the police could justify any delay, no matter how prejudicial or op-
pressive, whenever it could show that bringing charges might threaten
the usefulness of an agent or informer, however unimportant, or might
tip their hand to some putative confederate of the defendant, however
tenuous their belief that such a confederate exists. On the other hand,
forcing law enforcement agencies to drop all chance to prosecute a
convict in another jurisdiction whenever the exigencies of protecting
important informers or continuing investigations requires delay in
charging him, even where the delay is neither prejudicial nor par-
ticularly oppressive, would take insufficient account of the practical
requirements of law enforcement."5r
What is proposed, with reluctance, is a balancing test.10 On the
jurisdiction's side, the court could consider the seriousness of the
charge against the defendant, the essentiality of the informer or agent
being protected, 117 the dangerousness of the suspected conspiracy, tie
strength of the state's suspicion that such a conspiracy exists, and the
actual threat to the investigation of the ring if the defendant impris-
oned in another jurisdiction were charged promptly. On the defen-
115. See generally sources cited note 98 supra.
116. This is essentially the test the District of Columbia Court of Appeals employs.
though its due process analysis does not consider all the interests of the convict whida
analysis on speedy trial grounds would. See p. 782 supra. Examining all the circum-
stances is the essential test for determining whether there has been denial of a defendant's
right to a speedy trial. See Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 CwUM. L.
R,. 846-52 (1957); United States v. Burke, 224 F. Supp. 41 (D.D.C. 1963) (pre-charge de-
lay included in determining the defendant's right had been violated).
117. For instance, the police might be able to use more undercover agents so that the
identity of a single agent need not be protected for as long. Cf. Ross v. United States,
349 F.2d 210, 212-13 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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dant's side, the court should take account of the prejudice to him
which is likely to flow from the delayed trial as well as the oppressive-
ness of the delay in the particular case. The court must then strike
a balance between the conflicting interests to determine whether the
charges against the convict should be dismissed or not.
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